This study examines whether active investment managers profit over the short-term or hold static positions (i.e. interpreting) in stocks surrounding public earnings announcements. We utilize a database comprising the daily transactions of institutional equity managers to quantify both the returns generated and the types of trading behavior exhibited by institutions surrounding earnings releases. We also examine whether managers are rational in constructing their trading strategies, and find evidence of irrationality based on portfolio weights. Whilst overweight managers appear to behave rationally, under-weight managers do not.
Introduction
Recent literature has documented active equity managers as having some ability to generate superior returns to appropriately specified benchmarks (see for example Grinblatt and Titman (1989) , Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) , Wermers (2000) , Cesari and Panetta (2002) , Gallagher (2003) , and Pinnuck (2003)), and therefore managers may be considered 'informed traders'. However, very little is known about the nature of information that these investors possess. Traditional mutual fund performance measures, such as the Jensen measure, classify fund managers as either informed or uninformed. They provide no finer understanding of the relative superiority of active funds with different types of information.
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As a consequence, notwithstanding the long-history of mutual fund research, the literature provides no insight into the character of the private information possessed by fund managers, and the importance of unique categories of information to the overall performance of active funds.
The character of superior information possessed by fund managers may be classified along a number of dimensions. In this study we employ an approach that best reflects the economics of information dissemination into security prices. Livine (2000) suggests that 'informed traders' may be divided into two groups; those that (i) are privately informed of news events before such news is made public (hereafter "private information"), and/or (ii) 'interpret' publicly available news more quickly than other market participants (hereafter "interpretation"). Private information itself could be due to either (a) fundamental analysis and research or (b) information received privately in the days immediately prior to the announcement. 1 The fund manager performance studies have evolved to be able to decompose the performance results of a fund into components due to i) superior (inferior) market timing and ii) superior (inferior) stock selection. The studies have not attempted to attribute the stock selection skill of the fund manager into components.
The main reason why existing research has been unable to measure the nature of information possessed by fund managers is the limited availability of finer portfolio holdings and trade data. While recent research examines both institutional and mutual fund holdings at quarterly intervals, the resulting low frequency data available from SEC filings represents a significant limitation for researchers in trying to associate information releases that occur on specific days with short-term changes in a fund's stock holdings (for example, see Baker et al. (2004) ). In short, quarterly portfolio holdings in conjunction with public information announcements leads to difficulties in quantifying either the value of private information or the sophistication of interpretation associated with the news event. In this study we use a unique database of daily portfolio holdings and trades of mutual funds to examine their private information and ability to interpret a news event.
We use earnings announcements as our experiment for a news event for a number of reasons.
Firstly, earnings announcements represent a mandated news event that occurs at regular intervals for all listed companies. Second, earnings announcements represent disclosure of information concerning the fundamental economic value of companies that results in significant security price changes (see Ball and Brown 1968) . This feature of the news event allows us to test both for pre-disclosure private information, and the ability of fund managers to interpret. Third, investment managers typically characterize their investment process as being implemented given a self-stated investment style, such as value, growth, growth-at-areasonable price (GARP), or style neutral. Investment style represents a manager's preferences for certain stocks with respect to measures of valuation, which themselves rely on the earnings generated by corporations. Therefore the ability of managers to exploit private earnings information concerning security valuation represents an important empirical test of manager skill. Fourth, it is frequently asserted in both the academic literature and financial press that fund managers focus on near-term earnings performance in their trading (e.g., Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 1998; Lang and McNichols 1997, Bushee 1998; Bushee 1999 ).
This suggests that fund managers are likely to trade in respect of this event and attempt to generate abnormal returns from earnings news.
Therefore, using earnings announcements as the experimental setting, we can examine several important questions regarding both the nature of the information used by investment managers to earn superior abnormal returns, and the economic value of this information to their overall performance. Specifically we examine the following questions: Do managers have superior information regarding earnings announcements? What is the nature of this information: Is it selective disclosure or fundamental analysis or some combination thereof?
Do fund managers have the ability to be able to interpret the earnings announcement better than other investors and subsequently realize abnormal returns? What is the economic importance of each source of information to the overall performance of the fund manager?
Finally, how do investment managers trade subsequent to the announcement in an attempt to profit from their information? Do active managers have superior information regarding earnings announcements? Our first research question investigates the basic underlying notion that managers have superior information and that a significant component of this is earnings information. While it is frequently asserted that fund managers focus on earnings announcements in their trading, the economic value of earnings announcements, and their contribution to overall fund performance is unknown. We therefore examine if immediately prior to announcements fund managers are over (under) weight good (bad) announcements. This provides insight into whether active investment managers directly profit from earnings announcements.
The over (under) weight position of stocks in a fund manager's portfolio prior to an announcement are a function of two types of superior information (a) information based on fundamental analysis due to research and data search at either a firm or industry level or (b) those based on selective disclosure/insider information provided by direct and exclusive communication from company management to fund managers. An example of this type of information would be "leakage" of the actual earnings to a select group of investors in the days before an announcement. Fund managers potentially have both types of information with respect to a forthcoming earnings announcement. Based on the purported objectives of the fund manager, fundamentals information incorporated into portfolio holdings are likely to represent the more economically important source of information. 2 To examine whether fund managers possess any information due to selective disclosure, we examine the trades immediately prior to the announcement.
We then examine whether fund managers are better able to interpret earnings announcements than the average investor. Since Jensen (1968), there has been extensive research concerning mutual fund performance. However there is no empirical study that has examined, given the same set of public information, whether fund managers are better able to interpret or analyze public information than other investors. We use a unique database of daily trades to examine whether (i) fund managers engage in detailed examination of public information disclosure and (ii) if they profit from such analysis. To answer this question we first examine if fund managers trade given public announcements concerning corporate earnings. We then examine if fund managers subsequently profit from their trades made on public announcements. Our research therefore represents a direct test of the efficient markets hypothesis.
We also examine the relative contribution to overall performance of both the preannouncement portfolio weights (which proxies for information based on fundamental analysis), trades due to selective disclosure (trading before the announcement) and interpretation trades (trades during the announcement). While there is a large body of literature that has examined the performance of mutual funds, due to the unavailability of data, the literature has thus far been unable to examine the relative importance of short term profiting, and interpreting. Accordingly, we give context to the economic importance of short term profiting and interpreting to the performance of fund managers, by comparing the dollar value of each strategy, as a proportion of funds under management, to the performance gain accruing over the announcement period due to the excess weight in the stock.
With the daily trading data of active equity managers, we are also able to answer questions regarding the rationality of their trading strategies. As sophisticated investors, we would expect their trading behavior to be devoid of irrational irregularities. Specifically, we test for symmetries in trading strategies based on current portfolio holdings. Since over or underweight positions contribute to a manager's alpha symmetrically, we should observe symmetrical trading strategies for both over and underweight managers. For example underweight managers should short-term profit if they receive good and bad information to the same extent that overweight managers do. We are also able to investigate the disposition effect, verifying empirically whether managers are more likely to realize gains rather than losses.
Our main findings are as follows. First, fund managers hold higher proportions of their portfolios in stocks that subsequently announce good earnings information indicating that managers do indeed possess superior information regarding earnings announcements.
Second, we find evidence of both short-term profiting and interpreting behavior. This implies active managers receive information regarding public earnings announcements in the days immediately prior to the public release, and are able to profit from their trades conditional on such information. Those managers that do not receive private information are able to interpret the public release more quickly than other market participants, also enabling them to earn abnormal returns. Third, when we investigate the relative importance of earnings-related trading strategies, and compare with the alpha generated from the portfolio positions held immediately prior to the announcement, we find these strategies comprise only a small percentage of the fund's alpha generated over the period. However, we do find that when managers have private information they are able to more than double the average profit they generate from the announcement. Lastly, despite institutions being considered as 'sophisticated' investors, our sample of managers exhibit irrational trading behavior. We document asymmetrical short-term profiting behavior, in that overweight managers profit from both good news and bad news, while underweight managers only profit from bad news.
Furthermore, we find that underweight managers are more prone to the disposition effect, where they are less likely to reverse their losing trades to limit losses.
This remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related literature. Section 3 we describe the construction of the database and present descriptive statistics. In Section 4 we develop the research questions and outline the research design.
Section 5 provides the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
The study contributes to two broad streams of literature. The primary contribution of the study is to the fund performance and institutional trading literature. Traditional fund performance studies focus on measuring the absolute or relative performance of mutual funds (for example, Jensen (1968 ), Malkiel (1995 ), Gruber (1996 ), Ferson and Schadt (1996 and more recently, Grinblatt and Titman (1989b), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) , Wermers (2000) , and Cesari and Panetta (2002)). However, little is said about the type of information managers may be using to generate alpha. Whether managers are collecting private, and presumably costly information, or generating alpha by simply interpreting publicly available information is a question not answered by the literature. This issue is important because the costs of information search, and the generated alpha thereof, justifies management fees. Accordingly, this is one of the first studies to provide a finer understanding of the different types of information used by managers.
More recent studies have analyzed institutional trades (see for example Chan and Lakonishok (1993,1995) , Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang, and Wood (2004), and Foster, Gallagher and Looi (2005) ), however our study differs from these by combining institutional trading data with a defined, scheduled release of public information; the earnings announcement. By using the announcements as an experimental setting, we are able to more clearly define the informational context within which the institutional trades occur. This means that we can identify trading sequences as part of a unified trading strategy surrounding the announcement.
Without this setting, it is difficult to be certain whether trades that occur within close temporal proximity are part of the same strategy or due to two or more separate pieces of information.
Earnings announcements are the subject of a large body of literature, however it is only more recently that trade level data has been combined with announcement data. Christophe, Ferri,
and Angel (2004) examine short-sales on Nasdaq listed firms, while Ramnath (2002) investigates the response of the stock market and market analysts to earnings announcements made after other firms have made announcements in the same industry and find that although analysts update expectations using leader firm announcements, the stock market does not.
The prior literature that has examined institutional trading behavior in respect of earnings announcements can be categorized in to two groups. Firstly there is the stream of research that has predominantly been forced to rely on quarterly ownership data. The study closest to ours is Baker, Litov, Wachter and Wurgler (2004) . They document that the change in fund manager holdings in a company over a calendar quarter is associated with abnormal returns at the time of subsequent announcements of quarterly earnings. This result, they conclude, suggests informed trading by institutions based on superior information about forthcoming earnings. However our study differs from Baker et al. (2004) both in the questions examined and empirical approach employed. It is difficult to associate quarterly holdings with any particular news event and to determine either the level of private information or the sophistication of the interpretation associated with the news event.
3 In this study we use a unique database of daily portfolio holdings and trades of mutual funds to examine the nature of the superior information that gives rise to an association between their holdings and earnings announcement date returns.
There is also a stream of literature that has used daily and intra-day data. For example studies by Lee (1992) and Amin and Lee (1997) examine the intra-day trading activity of traders in the hours and days immediately prior to announcement. However as the portfolio positions and identity of the trader is unknown the sequence and performance of the trades cannot be 3 There may be a systematic difference between the characteristics of the stockholdings in quarter-end portfolio and the portfolio holdings in the between quarter month ends, due to fund reporting biases. 3 Thus the returns attributable to quarter-end portfolios may not be representative of the typical fund portfolio. As a consequence, performance results based on quarterly holdings may be spurious, as they may be driven by agency phenomena (such as window dressing) that are not being properly accounted for. determined and the contribution of that performance to the portfolio return cannot be determined. Being able to determine the sequence of trades is important to understanding the nature of information possessed by fund managers. For example it is frequently asserted that fund managers are "short-term profit-takers" who obtain selective disclosure of the earnings to be announced and then reverse this position after the announcement. 4 We use our database to examine whether this behavior exists by testing whether they buy before and then sell immediately after.
The study also contributes to the literature that seeks to understand how public disclosure of corporate financial information affects private information acquisition activity in the preearnings announcement period. This literature has been greatly influenced by the theoretical models of Kim and Verrecchia (1991a) and others, and has hypothesised cross-investor preearnings announcement information asymmetry. This is an issue of importance to policy regulators who often justify required public disclosure of accounting information as a way to 'level the playing field' by providing equal access to information across investors (see e.g., Lev (1988) ).
To fully understand how mandatory public disclosure of accounting information affects the extent to which there is equal access to information, it is necessary to examine how these disclosures affect investment in pre-announcement private information collection. It has been argued, by McNichols and Trueman (1994) and others, that mandatory disclosures, contrary to their intention, actually decrease the extent to which the 'playing field' is level prior to the disclosure. This is because it is possible such disclosure stimulates the investment in private information collection. This view is shared by regulators, across a number of capital markets, who have recently expressed concern fund managers may be using earnings information, obtained through selective disclosure, to profit at the expense of less informed traders including individuals. 5 We show that the extent to which this short-term profiting is actually occurring is low compared to the alpha generated through portfolio positions.
Data
Our study utilizes the unique Portfolio analytics database comprising of daily trades and monthly holdings data for 34 active Australian equity managers. The data was collected with the assistance of Mercers Investment Consulting and contains information from 2 January 1995 to 31 December 2001, however since our study requires daily trading observations of a sufficient number, we limit our study to the last 2 years of the sample. The study also relies on stock price information sourced from the Australian Stock Exchange Automated Trading System (SEATS) provided by SIRCA. The SEATS data includes all trade information for stocks listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX).
Earnings information was obtained from the ASX Signal G database. We use all reports that have codes 03004 (half yearly report), 03003 (full year report), and 03014 (profit report).
Commonly, profit reports overlapped on the same day as full or half yearly reports. For the purpose of this study, we restrict the sample of stocks under investigation to the top (i.e. most active) 50 stocks as ranked by manager trading activity over the sample period. This restriction is in place in order to maintain a reasonable number of manager trades per day per stock 6 . Manager trading activity is defined as the number of purchases plus the number of sales made in a stock by the managers in the database over the sample period. We rank and select stocks according to trading activity rather than capitalization since our study focuses on manager trading activity, nevertheless, many of the top 50 stocks according to capitalization are included in the selected stocks.
In Table 1 , we provide some descriptive statistics for the earnings announcements in our sample divided by good and bad announcements. Implicit in any tests regarding earnings announcements is the need to define the terms 'good' and 'bad' announcements. Setting the day of the announcement as day 't', we define a good (bad) announcement as one where the excess stock return over the value weighted benchmark from day 't' to 't+3' is positive (negative). This approach is preferable to one based on accounting numbers since this would require specification of a classification model, introducing potential specification errors.
Therefore, we use ex-post stock returns as a 'perfect hind-sight' measure of the strength of an earnings announcement. We choose the three day window to ensure the market has enough time to absorb the information in the announcement, whilst reducing the risk that nonannouncement news may have affected stock returns. In unreported results we reproduce our results using a 5 day window and find similar results.
Overall, we have 203 announcements, of which 114 were good and 89 were bad. In the four days prior to the announcement, mean stock returns were close to zero for both good and bad announcements, and cumulative daily trading volume was close to four times that of average 6 We have also reproduced the results using the largest 50 stocks by market capitalisation as at the start of the sample period and obtain very similar results.
daily trading volume over the 20 days prior. After good announcements, mean excess stock returns were 3.75 percent in the three days subsequent to the announcement (including the day of the announcement), whilst that of bad announcements was -4.04 percent.
Research Design
We set out the research design in respect of each question below.
Do managers have superior information regarding earnings announcement?
If managers can predict whether the outcome of an announcement will be good or bad, then this information should have an impact on both the portfolio construction, as well as the trading activity immediately prior to the announcement. In terms of portfolio construction, we should observe managers holding a greater proportion of their portfolio in stocks that subsequently announce good news, and vice versa for bad announcements. Therefore if we take the mean excess weight over the value weighted benchmark for each manager prior to each good announcement and compare that with the mean excess weight prior to bad announcements then we should observe a positive spread.
If fund managers have obtained private earnings information due to selective disclosure or information leakage then this should be evident by an increase in purchasing (selling) activity prior to good (bad) announcements. To test for this, we pool together the 50 stocks with the most trading activity (measured as the number of manager purchases plus sales) and we regress the standardized number of managers purchasing (selling) against past stock returns, and dummy variables indicating whether the stock day observation is in the five days prior to a good or bad announcement, during a good or bad announcement or after a good, or bad announcement, giving a total of six dummy variables. The regression equation is as follows: Where y s,t is either the standardized number of manager purchasing or selling on day 't' in stock 's'. We standardize manager activity since the level and dispersion of manager trading activity varies across stocks. The capitalized variables are dummy variables indicating whether day 't' for stock 's' is within the temporal zone of interest. For example, PRIORGOOD indicates whether the observation is made within 5, 10 or 20 days prior to a good announcement, while AFTERBAD, indicates whether the observation is made within the 5, 10 or 20 day window after a bad announcement.
We also include several control variables in the regression; lagged stock returns, dummy variables for each stock, and risk characteristic control variables. We include lagged stock returns since Foster, Gallagher and Looi (2005) show that institutional trading is influenced by lagged stock returns. The dummy variables for each stock account for fixed stock effects in the panel, and the risk characteristic control variables ensure that changes in the level of manager purchasing and selling related to common risk factors are accounted for. Market is the return on the value weighted portfolio of all stocks listed on the ASX300 (the largest 300 stocks on the exchange, not to be confused with the ASX/S&P 300 which is an index constructed by Standard and Poor's) on day 't'. Size, is the value weighted return on a portfolio of stocks comprised of the largest quintile of stocks (as ranked by market capitalisation) in the ASX300 less the value weighted return on a portfolio of stocks comprised of the smallest quintile of stocks in the ASX300. BMRatio is the value weighted return on a portfolio of stocks comprised of the largest quintile of stocks (as ranked by book to market ratio) in the ASX300 less the value weighted return on a portfolio of stocks comprised of the smallest quintile of stocks in the ASX300. Momentum is the value-weighted return on a portfolio of stocks comprised of the largest quintile of stocks (as ranked by stock return calculated over the last 130 days) in the ASX300 less the value weighted return on a portfolio of stocks comprised of the smallest quintile of stocks in the ASX300. δ is an indicator variable for each stock.
Having identified whether managers have superior information regarding earnings announcements, the next research question deals with the type of information used by managers to generate alpha.
What is the nature of the information used by managers to earn alpha?
Livine (2000) suggests that informed traders may be 'short-term profiters' who receive private information prior to a public announcement, or 'interpreters' who receive no private information prior, but simply interpret the information contained in the public announcement relatively more quickly than other market participants. Accordingly, we attempt to identify both types of information.
If managers receive private information regarding the direction of the earnings announcement (whether it is good or bad news) prior to the public release then we would expect the amount of manager purchasing (selling) to be higher immediately prior to good (bad) announcements in comparison to non-announcement periods. We investigate such changes in trading activity with regression equation (1). However, while the regressions will detect the overall level of manager trading, it does not tell us whether there are any changes in the pattern of trading sequences due to earnings announcements. Examining trading sequences provides for a more granular investigation of the nature of the information used by fund managers. For example, if manager's are indeed Livine short-term profiteers, then evidence of such short term profittaking should be detectable by a statistically significant increase in the proportion of managers that purchase (sell) before good (bad) announcements who then subsequently sell (purchase) after.
We detect differences in trading sequences by comparing the mean proportion of occurrences of each trade sequence for good and bad announcements against that obtained from a random sample of observations. For example, say we observe the mean proportion of managers purchasing prior to a good announcement, who then subsequently sell, to be x percent, while the mean of a random selection of 1000 stock day observations of the same trade sequence is y percent, then the increase in the purchase, then sell trade sequence is (x-y) percent. The random draw also gives a distribution of trade sequence proportions that can be used to estimate numerical p-values. When conducting the random trial for good (bad) announcements, we randomly select from periods that experience excess price appreciation (depreciation) relative to the value weighted benchmark since our partition on good (bad) announcements implicitly conditions on positive (negative) excess stock returns.
Even if managers never receive private information prior to earnings announcements, they may still earn abnormal returns by 'interpreting' the announcement on the day of information release and trading accordingly. This type of 'informed' trading should result in an increase in manager purchasing (selling) on the good (bad) earnings announcement day. However, since purchasing (selling) during good (bad) announcements may also be linked to prior trades (for example a manager with incorrect information may sell prior to a good announcement, and then purchase on the day of the announcement in order to reverse the position) we also examine the prior trading activity of managers trading on the day of the announcement. We expect that since pure 'interpreters' know that they do not have private information, they should refrain from trading prior, and only trade on the day of the announcement in the appropriate direction.
The next research question deals with the economic importance of the above trading strategies, and is important in giving context to the contribution of short-term profiting and interpreting to the generation of alpha.
What is the importance of short-term profiting, and interpreting to overall performance?
By comparing the dollar profit as a percentage of funds under management made from shortterm profiting and interpreting against that of the buy and hold return from the portfolio holdings, we can comment on the relative importance of these strategies to overall performance.
Are managers rational when carrying out these strategies?
The rationality of market participants is an assumption recently being called into question by much of the behavioral finance literature (Barberis, Shliefer and Vishny 1998; Odean 1988; Odean 1999) . Our database provides a unique opportunity to test whether informed traders behave rationally or not. Accordingly, our final research question deals with the degree to which institutional traders are susceptible to irrational or 'informationless trading'.
In particular, we ask the following question: is the quality of a manager's information search dependant upon their current holding? If managers are rational, then we would expect that the information search should be independent of the current level of investment in the portfolio. This is because; overweight and underweight positions contribute equally to the performance of the fund over and above that of the passive benchmark. Therefore we should see that shortterm profiting and interpreting in overweight and underweight positions should be symmetrical. For example, managers that are underweight should attempt to short-term profit if they receive good news, or bad news prior to an earnings announcement, and likewise for overweight managers.
In order to investigate the hypothesized rational symmetry in trading behavior, we partition managers into over and underweight groups for each announcement. Since most managers hold portfolio weights in excess of the value weighted benchmark, we define overweight as managers with a greater than median weight in the portfolio, compared to the rest of the sample, and vice versa for underweight managers. suggests that investors are more likely to realize gains than losses. Such behavior is found by Cici (2005) to represent a significant drag on performance, and is therefore irrational.
We are able to observe whether managers are susceptible to the disposition effect by investigating their trading activity when they sell (purchase) prior to good (bad) announcements. If managers are indeed rational, then they should subsequently reverse their trades.
Empirical Results

Do managers have superior information regarding earnings announcements?
If managers are able to predict the outcome of earnings announcements, then we should observe managers placing a greater proportion of their portfolio in good announcement stocks relative to bad announcement stocks. In Table 2 , we examine the spread in mean portfolio weight over the value weighted benchmark between good and bad announcement stocks in the month-end immediately prior to the announcement. We find that the mean excess portfolio weight for good announcement stocks is 0.000687, or about 7 basis points, higher than that of bad announcement stocks. This spread is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In order to give some context to this spread, we conduct a random trial by randomly selecting three day periods where the excess stock returns relative to the value weighted benchmark over the period is positive (negative). We then compare the mean excess portfolio weights of the managers in the sample as at the month-end immediately prior to the randomly selected three day period. Since a random three day period is not likely to be the temporal focus of a managers portfolio construction, we should expect to see very little spread in the mean excess weight between positive and negative random three day periods, which is indeed what we find.
The random trial can be extended for longer horizons in order to confirm that indeed managers are constructing their portfolios with the long term in mind. We randomly select 30
and 90 day positive excess stock return periods and document the mean spread in excess weights and find a statistically significant spread in portfolio weights when forecasting over the 90 day period. The magnitude of the mean spread of 0.000728 is similar to that of the earnings announcement spread, indicating that managers construct their portfolios immediately prior to earnings announcements with a similar temporal view as a 90 day horizon.
Having examined portfolio weights for evidence of superior information regarding earnings announcements, we now turn to trading activity. In Table 3 , we present regression estimates for equation (1). We run the regression using 5, 10 and 20 day windows in order to obtain a suitable window over which to associated manager trading with earnings announcements.
This is important since managers must balance two opposing issues when deciding when to trade prior to an announcement. Kyle (1985) shows that informed traders spread out their trades over time in order to extract the most benefit from their private information. However the closer to the announcement the manager trades, the higher transaction costs are.
Therefore, when we examine different temporal windows, we should see windows that are too long or too short giving little or no change in manager trading activity.
We document that in the 10 days prior to a good earnings announcement, the mean standardized level of manager purchasing per day is 0.0941 (statistically significant at the 5 percent level) higher than in the equivalent period prior to bad announcements. However, we do not find any evidence of a differential in selling activity levels prior to good and bad announcements. While the regressions using the 5 and 20 day windows yield coefficients with the same sign, neither are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. We also show (using the 10 day regression results) that during good and bad announcements, the level of purchasing and selling increases by 0.4413 and 0.3902 standard deviations of manager trading activity respectively. From this point forward, we use the 10 day window of observation around earnings announcements since we find that window to yield the strongest change in manager trading activity.
What is the nature of the information used by managers to earn alpha?
Many studies have shown that managers earn significant abnormal returns, and therefore possess superior information relative to the average market participant. However, the nature of the information possessed by institutional traders is a question yet to be examined by the literature. Managers may receive private information through costly search, or they may simply exploit market inefficiencies and interpret public releases of information more quickly than other market participants. In order to identify the type of information held by managers it is important to examine their trading sequences. For example, managers attempting to profit from short lived positive information received prior to a public announcement should purchase prior to, and sell subsequent to the announcement.
Furthermore, restricting our analysis to the level of manager trading activity fails to account for the varied motivations for trading. By examining manager trade sequences, we are able to better identify the type of information held by the managers, as well as the strategies used by them to profit from it. For example, we document an increase in the level of manager purchasing during good announcements (see Table 3 ), however, this increase may be a result of (1) managers wishing to reverse previous sells that may have been made under an incorrect belief that the announcement would be bad, or (2) managers interpreting the announcement as good, and trading accordingly. This distinction in trading behavior cannot be analyzed in the previous regression framework, and therefore, we present statistics giving the mean frequency of occurrence of the various trade sequences for both announcement and non-announcement periods.
Short term profiting from good news should be evidenced by purchasing followed by selling after a price rise, and vice versa for bad news. We document that, out of the managers that purchase prior to a good announcement, the mean proportion of those that subsequently sell after the announcement is 20.242 percent. This is to be compared with a non-announcement mean proportion of 12.287 percent, with the difference being statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Therefore, the evidence indicates that managers have private information regarding earnings announcements prior to the public release, and are realizing the profits made from their prior purchasing by subsequently selling. Additionally, examining the proportion of managers who purchase again, or do nothing after purchasing prior to a good announcement, it becomes clear that managers are not purchasing prior to a good announcement in order to dramatically alter their portfolio positions. If they were, then we should see an increase in the proportion of managers who purchase and then purchase again or do nothing. Instead, managers take advantage of private information received prior to an announcement for short-term profit taking rather than for portfolio construction.
It may seem surprising that managers use private information to make short term profits rather than to build portfolios, however it may be that managers build up portfolio positions over an extended period of time prior to earnings announcements on the basis of long term fundamentals information and identify earnings announcements as an opportunity to short term profit on information that is likely to be short lived and quickly impounded into prices once the information becomes public.
Turning to interpreting behavior, we find that for bad announcements, the proportion of managers who do nothing prior, who then sell during is 41.352 percent, compared to a nonannouncement mean of 27.311 percent (statistically significant difference at the 5 percent level). These results indicate that managers are interpreting bad announcements, however, we do not find any evidence of interpreting for good announcements. We also find some evidence of managers selling during bad announcements to reverse previous purchases (17.767 percent for announcement periods verses 11.99 percent for non-announcement, with the difference statistically significant at the 10 percent level). The implication of this finding is that managers who make incorrect bets, subsequently correct them on the day of the announcement. We explore incorrect bets in more detail in research question 4.
What is the importance of short-term profiting, and interpreting to overall performance?
In this section we give context to the economic importance of short term profiting and interpreting to the performance of fund managers, by comparing the dollar value of each strategy, as a proportion of funds under management, to the performance gain accruing over the announcement period due to the excess weight in the stock.
The dollar gain to short term profiting is the minimum of the quantity of shares purchased and sold, multiplied by the difference in transaction price. When there is more than one purchase or sale, the weighted average price is used. The dollar gain is then divided by funds under management in order to scale for fund size. The value of interpreting is calculated as the quantity of shares traded multiplied by the difference in price between the transaction price and the closing midpoint price at the end of the observation window, divided by funds under management. The performance gain due to portfolio positions is directly comparable to the above measures of gain to short term profiting and interpreting, and is calculated as the excess weight in the portfolio of the stock over the value weighted benchmark weight, multiplied by the excess stock return over the value weighted index.
The first column of Table 5 gives the total contribution to performance over the entire sample period, over all managers for each strategy. The second column gives the percentage contribution. The results show that short term profiting makes up three percent of the total contribution to performance of all the strategies around earnings announcements, while interpreting makes up less than one percent. These figures indicate that short term trading makes up only a small fraction of the abnormal returns earned around earnings announcement. By far the major contribution comes from over or under weight portfolio positions in appropriate stocks. This finding is indeed comforting since we should expect managers to earn the majority of their alpha from long term portfolio construction than short term trading.
Despite making up a small overall contribution to outperformance, when managers do engage in short term profiting, we find that the mean contribution to performance is actually higher than that obtained from the portfolio position. On average, if a manager engages in short term profiting, their gain to performance is 0.01 percent per stock over the announcement period, compared to 0.0082 percent for the portfolio position. These figures indicate that when managers do receive private information prior to earnings announcements, they can more than double the benefit they would otherwise gain from the announcement, and therefore short term profiting can become important in the generation of alpha.
Are managers rational when carrying out these strategies?
We test the rationality of institutional traders in two ways, (1) we test whether the information search prior to earnings announcements is dependent on their current portfolio position, and (2) we investigate the disposition effect, that is, the irrational tendency to realize gains rather than losses.
Since overweight and underweight positions contribute to excess performance over the benchmark equally, then rational agents should conduct their information search prior to earnings announcements without prejudice to their current portfolio holdings. For example, an underweight manager has the same opportunity and risk as an overweight manager that an announcement will be better (or worse) than expected, and therefore we should observe a symmetrical increase in the level of short term profiting prior to good and bad announcements.
It may be argued that if managers underweight stocks that are less likely to provide positive earnings announcement, then their opportunity to short term profit if the announcement is good will be reduced, and vice versa for overweight managers. We control for this by measuring the proportion of underweight managers who purchase prior to good announcements, and vice versa for overweight managers. By conditioning on underweight (overweight) manager purchasing (selling) before good (bad) announcements, we effectively control for the loss in opportunity to short term profit. Tables 6 and 7 report the mean proportion of observed trade sequences for under-and overweighted managers, respectively. The results show that underweight managers are able to short term profit on bad announcements, as evidenced by the increase in the sell-buy trade sequence from 16.095 percent in non-announcement periods to 31.618 percent in announcement periods. However, we do not find any evidence of underweight managers short term profiting on good announcements. Turning to overweight managers, we find that they do not display this asymmetry, and are able to short term profit on both good and bad announcements (statistically significant at the 1 percent level for good announcements and at the 10 percent level for bad announcements).
These results indicate that managers are irrational in that their information search depends on their current stock holdings. If a manager is overweight, they are sensitive to both good and bad private information prior to earnings announcements, whilst if they are underweight, they are only sensitive to bad news.
We investigate whether this asymmetrical irrationality extends to the disposition effect.
Managers that make incorrect bets on earnings announcements should reverse their bet if they behave rationally. However, since our evidence from Tables 6 and 7 indicate that underweight managers behave irrationally, then we should see the disposition effect more strongly in these managers relative to overweight managers. In Tables 8 and 9 , we examine trade sequences conditioning on manager trading direction being in opposition to the direction of the announcement. For example, the left hand side of Panel A in Table 8 gives the mean proportion of subsequent trading activity conditioning on underweight manager selling prior to good announcements.
Our results show that underweight managers are indeed unlikely to reverse their bets after the earnings announcement. While the sell-buy trade sequence for good announcements rises from 13.912 percent in non-announcement periods to 19.249 percent, the difference is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Similarly, the difference in the buy-sell trade sequence for bad announcements in announcement and non-announcement periods is also statistically indistinguishable. Overweight managers, however are likely to reverse incorrect bets. We find evidence significant at the 5 percent level that overweight managers who sell (buy) prior to good (bad) announcements are likely to subsequently reverse their trades.
These findings indicate that a manager's holding of a stock influences their information search, despite the fact that over and under weight positions contribute to outperformance symmetrically. This asymmetry in information search extends to their trading strategies, with overweight managers behaving more rationally, acknowledging mistakes and reversing incorrect bets, while underweight managers do not.
Conclusion
Many studies find institutional investors are 'informed', however few investigate the exact type of information they may be using to 'beat the market'. We show that active Australian equity managers are able to generate alpha from earnings announcements through a variety of ways. We show that not only do they hold advantageous portfolio holdings prior to the announcement, they also engage in short term profiting by buying (selling) before good (bad) announcements and selling (buying) after bad ones. We also find that evidence of interpreting behavior, that is, managers refraining from trading in the days prior to the announcement, only to trade appropriately during the announcement. Interestingly, although managers are often seen as sophisticated traders, we document evidence of irrational trading behavior.
Specifically, despite over and under weight positions contributing symmetrically to portfolio excess performance, we find underweight managers only short term profit from bad news, while over weight managers short term profit from both good and bad news. Further investigation shows that this irrational behavior extends to the disposition effect. We document that over weight managers are far more likely than under weight managers to reverse their trades if their initial trade prior to the announcement was a losing trade.
In further research, we aim to link documented patterns of stock returns and trading volume around earnings announcements with institutional trading. Since these traders comprise a large proportion of the market, it is likely that they have an important role to play in the stock return-volume dynamic prior to announcements. Table 2 The columns headed 'Announcements' reports the distribution of manager weight excess of the value weighted benchmark as at the month-end immediately prior to good and bad earnings announcements. A good earnings announcement is defined as one where the sum of excess stock returns over the value weighted benchmark over the three days subsequent to the announcement is greater than zero, and vice versa for bad earnings announcements. The columns headed 'Random Trial 3 Days', 'Random Trial 30 Days' and 'Random Trial 90 Days' reports the distribution of manager weight excess as at the month-end immediately prior to randomly selected 3, 30 and 90 day periods respectively. Where y s,t is either the standardized number of manager purchasing or selling on day 't' in stock 's'. We standardize manager activity since the level and dispersion of manager trading activity varies across stocks. The capitalized variables are dummy variables indicating whether day 't' for stock 's' is within the temporal zone of interest. For example, PRIORGOOD indicates whether the observation is made within 5, 10 and 20 days prior to a good announcement, while AFTERBAD, indicates whether the observation is made within the 5, 10, and 20 day window after a bad announcement. Market is the return on the value weighted portfolio of all stocks listed on the ASX300 (the largest 300 stocks on the exchange, not to be confused with the ASX/S&P 300 which is an index constructed by Standard and Poor's) on day 't'. Size, is the value weighted return on a portfolio of stocks comprised of the largest quintile of stocks (as ranked by market capitalisation) in the ASX300 less the value weighted return on a portfolio of stocks comprised of the smallest quintile of stocks in the ASX300. BMRatio is the value weighted return on a portfolio of stocks comprised of the largest quintile of stocks (as ranked by book to market ratio) in the ASX300 less the value weighted return on a portfolio of stocks comprised of the smallest quintile of stocks in the ASX300. Momentum is the value-weighted return on a portfolio of stocks comprised of the largest quintile of stocks (as ranked by stock return calculated over the last 130 days) in the ASX300 less the value weighted return on a portfolio of stocks comprised of the smallest quintile of stocks in the ASX300. δ is an indicator variable for each stock. Table 4 Panel A reports the mean proportion of managers who subsequently buy, sell or do nothing, conditional on purchasing prior to a good announcement (and vice versa for bad announcements). We also report the mean proportions of the corresponding trade sequences from a random trial. For example, the random trial mean for managers who sell subsequent to purchasing is 12.287 percent, compared to the good announcement mean of 20.242 percent. We use the random trials to build numeric p-values. We condition the random trial selection on 20 day periods that experience positive (negative) excess stock returns over the value weighted benchmark since good (bad) announcement periods experience positive (negative) excess returns. Panel B reports the mean proportion of managers who have purchased, sold or did nothing, conditional on purchasing during a good announcement (and vice versa for bad announcements). Panel C reports the mean proportion of managers who have purchased, sold or did nothing, conditional on purchasing after a good announcement (and vice versa for bad announcements). Table 5 Panel A reports statistics on the contribution of short-term profiting, interpreting, and excess weights to portfolio outperformance in the 20 day window surrounding earnings announcements. The contribution of short-term profiting strategies is calculated as the minimum of the quantity of stock purchased (sold) before good (bad) announcements which is subsequently sold (purchased) after good (bad) announcements, multiplied by the change in price, divided by funds under management. The contribution of interpreting is defined as the quantity of stock purchased (sold) during good (bad) announcements, multiplied by the change in price from the transaction price, to the midpoint of the close 10 days after the announcement, divided by funds under management. The contribution of excess weights is given by the weight of the stock in the manager's portfolio, less the value weighted benchmark weight, multiplied by the excess stock return over the value weighted benchmark over the 20 day window surrounding the earnings announcement. The contributions from over three strategies are computed for each earnings announcement in the sample. We also report the contribution of short-term profiting mistakes (selling before good announcements and vice versa for bad announcements). Panel B reports the percentile cut-off points for the distribution of contributions for the earnings announcements. Table 6 Panel A reports the mean proportion of underweight managers who subsequently buy, sell or do nothing, conditional on purchasing prior to a good announcement (and vice versa for bad announcements). An underweight manager is defined as a manager with lower than median weight in the stock as at the end-of-month immediately prior to the earnings announcement. We also report the mean proportions of the corresponding trade sequences from a random trial. For example, the random trial mean for managers who sell subsequent to purchasing is 16.772 percent, compared to the good announcement mean of 21.116 percent. We use the random trials to build numeric p-values. We condition the random trial selection on 20 day periods that experience positive (negative) excess stock returns over the value weighted benchmark since good (bad) announcement periods experience positive (negative) excess returns. Panel B reports the mean proportion of underweight managers who have purchased, sold or did nothing, conditional on purchasing during a good announcement (and vice versa for bad announcements). Panel C reports the mean proportion of underweight managers who have purchased, sold or did nothing, conditional on purchasing after a good announcement (and vice versa for bad announcements). Table 7 Panel A reports the mean proportion of overweight managers who subsequently buy, sell or do nothing, conditional on purchasing prior to a good announcement (and vice versa for bad announcements). An underweight manager is defined as a manager with higher than median weight in the stock as at the end-of-month immediately prior to the earnings announcement. We also report the mean proportions of the corresponding trade sequences from a random trial. For example, the random trial mean for managers who sell subsequent to purchasing is 8.5147 percent, compared to the good announcement mean of 19.523 percent. We use the random trials to build numeric p-values. We condition the random trial selection on 20 day periods that experience positive (negative) excess stock returns over the value weighted benchmark since good (bad) announcement periods experience positive (negative) excess returns. Panel B reports the mean proportion of underweight managers who have purchased, sold or did nothing, conditional on purchasing during a good announcement (and vice versa for bad announcements). Panel C reports the mean proportion of underweight managers who have purchased, sold or did nothing, conditional on purchasing after a good announcement (and vice versa for bad announcements). Prior manager trading conditional on purchasing during a good announcement
Prior manager trading conditional on selling during a bad announcement Panel C -Overweight manager trading before announcements conditioning on after activity
Prior manager trading conditional on purchasing after a good announcement Prior manager trading conditional on selling after a bad announcement Table 8 Panel A reports the mean proportion of underweight managers who subsequently buy, sell or do nothing, conditional on selling prior to a good announcement (and vice versa for bad announcements). An underweight manager is defined as a manager with lower than median weight in the stock as at the end-of-month immediately prior to the earnings announcement. We also report the mean proportions of the corresponding trade sequences from a random trial. For example, the random trial mean for managers who sell subsequent to purchasing is 13.192 percent, compared to the bad announcement mean of 19.249 percent. We use the random trials to build numeric p-values. We condition the random trial selection on 20 day periods that experience positive (negative) excess stock returns over the value weighted benchmark since good (bad) announcement periods experience positive (negative) excess returns. Panel B reports the mean proportion of underweight managers who have purchased, sold or did nothing, conditional on selling during a good announcement (and vice versa for bad announcements). Panel C reports the mean proportion of underweight managers who have purchased, sold or did nothing, conditional on selling after a good announcement (and vice versa for bad announcements). Table 9 Panel A reports the mean proportion of overweight managers who subsequently buy, sell or do nothing, conditional on selling prior to a good announcement (and vice versa for bad announcements). An overweight manager is defined as a manager with higher than median weight in the stock as at the end-of-month immediately prior to the earnings announcement. We also report the mean proportions of the corresponding trade sequences from a random trial. For example, the random trial mean for managers who sell subsequent to purchasing is 11.202 percent, compared to the bad announcement mean of 17.227 percent. We use the random trials to build numeric p-values. We condition the random trial selection on 20 day periods that experience positive (negative) excess stock returns over the value weighted benchmark since good (bad) announcement periods experience positive (negative) excess returns. Panel B reports the mean proportion of underweight managers who have purchased, sold or did nothing, conditional on selling during a good announcement (and vice versa for bad announcements). Panel C reports the mean proportion of underweight managers who have purchased, sold or did nothing, conditional on selling after a good announcement (and vice versa for bad announcements). 
